The Dark Side of the Blockchain World: Personal Safety Threats Faced by Encryption Asset Holders

In the dark forest of blockchain, we often discuss on-chain attacks, contract vulnerabilities, and hacker intrusions, but an increasing number of cases remind us that the risks have spread to off-chain.

Recently, a crypto billionaire and entrepreneur recounted an attempted kidnapping case he encountered last year during a court hearing. The attackers tracked his movements using GPS, forged passports, and disposable phones, launching an assault from behind as he was going upstairs, attempting to suffocate him with a bag and forcibly take control. The entrepreneur managed to escape only after biting off a portion of one of the assailant's fingers.

As the value of encryption assets continues to rise, violent attacks against encryption users are becoming increasingly frequent. This article will delve into the analysis of such attack methods, review typical cases, outline the criminal chain behind them, and propose practical prevention and response suggestions.

What is a wrench attack

The term "wrench attack" first appeared in web comics, describing an attacker who does not use technical means, but instead forces the victim to hand over passwords or assets through threats, extortion, or even kidnapping. This method of attack is direct, efficient, and has a low threshold.

Typical Case Review

Since the beginning of this year, there have been frequent kidnapping cases targeting encryption users, with victims including core members of projects, opinion leaders, and even ordinary users.

In early May, French police successfully rescued the father of a kidnapped cryptocurrency tycoon. The kidnappers demanded a ransom of several million euros and brutally severed his fingers to exert pressure on the family.

In January, a co-founder of a hardware wallet company and his wife were attacked at home by armed assailants, who also severed his fingers and filmed a video, demanding a ransom of 100 Bitcoins.

In early June, a man with dual French and Moroccan nationality was arrested in Tangier, suspected of planning multiple kidnappings of French cryptocurrency entrepreneurs. The French Minister of Justice confirmed that the suspect is wanted by Interpol for "kidnapping, illegal detention of hostages," and other charges.

In New York, an Italian crypto investor was lured to a villa and subjected to three weeks of captivity and torture. The criminal gang used chainsaws, electric shock devices, and drugs to implement threats, even suspending him from the top of a tall building to force him to hand over his wallet private key.

In mid-May, the daughter and young grandson of a co-founder of a certain encryption trading platform were nearly forcibly dragged into a white van on the streets of Paris. Fortunately, a passerby struck the van with a fire extinguisher, forcing the kidnapper to flee.

These cases indicate that, compared to on-chain attacks, offline violent threats are more direct, efficient, and have a lower threshold. The attackers are mostly young people, aged between 16 and 23, who possess a basic understanding of encryption. According to data released by the French prosecution, several minors have already been formally charged for their involvement in such cases.

In addition to publicly reported cases, the security team also noticed that some users encountered control or coercion by the other party during offline transactions when整理ing the information submitted by victims.

In addition, there are some "non-violent coercion" incidents that have not escalated into physical violence. For example, attackers threaten victims by grasping their privacy, whereabouts, or other leverage to force them to transfer funds. Although such situations do not cause direct harm, they have already touched on the boundary of personal threats, and whether they fall within the category of "wrench attacks" is still worth further discussion.

It is important to emphasize that the disclosed cases may only be the tip of the iceberg. Many victims choose to remain silent due to concerns about retaliation, law enforcement not taking their cases, or exposure of their identities, which makes it difficult to accurately assess the true scale of off-chain attacks.

Crime Chain Analysis

Based on multiple typical cases, we summarize that the criminal chain of wrench attacks roughly covers the following key links:

1. Information Locking

Attackers typically start with on-chain information, combining transaction behavior, tag data, NFT holding status, etc., to make an initial assessment of the target asset scale. At the same time, social media group chats, public speeches, interviews with opinion leaders, and even some leaked data also become important auxiliary intelligence sources.

2. Realistic positioning and contact

Once the target identity is confirmed, the attacker will attempt to obtain their real identity information, including residence, frequently visited locations, and family structure. Common methods include:

• Inducing targets to leak information on social platforms;
• Use public registration data (such as ENS bound email, domain registration information) for reverse lookup;
• Use leaked data for reverse search;
• Introduce the target into a controlled environment through tracking or false invitations.

3. Violent Threats and Extortion

Once the target is controlled, attackers often use violent means to force them to hand over their wallet private keys, mnemonic phrases, and two-factor authentication permissions. Common methods include:

• Physical harm such as beating, electric shock, and severing limbs;
• Coerce the victim to operate the transfer;
• Intimidate relatives and request family members to transfer funds on their behalf.

4. Money Laundering and Fund Transfer

After obtaining the private key or mnemonic phrase, attackers typically quickly transfer assets using methods including:

• Use a mixer to obscure the source of funds;
• Transfer to controlled addresses or non-compliant centralized exchange accounts;
• Liquidate assets through OTC channels or the black market.

Some attackers have a background in Blockchain technology, are familiar with on-chain tracing mechanisms, and will deliberately create multi-hop paths or cross-chain obfuscation to evade tracking.

Countermeasures

Using multi-signature wallets or decentralized mnemonic phrases is not practical in extreme scenarios of personal threat, often perceived by attackers as a refusal to cooperate, which in turn exacerbates violent behavior. In response to wrench attacks, a more prudent strategy should be "there's something to give, and the losses are controllable":

• Set up a lure wallet: Prepare an account that looks like the main wallet but holds only a small amount of assets, to be used for "stop-loss feeding" in case of danger.
• Family security management: Family members need to master the basic knowledge of asset location and response cooperation; set up a safety word to convey danger signals in case of abnormal situations; strengthen the security settings of household devices and the physical security of the residence.
• Avoid identity exposure: Avoid flaunting wealth or sharing transaction records on social platforms; avoid revealing the holding of encryption assets in real life; manage your circle of friends' information to prevent leaks from acquaintances. The most effective protection is always to make people "not know that you are a target worth monitoring."

Conclusion

With the rapid development of the encryption industry, understanding your customer ( KYC ) and anti-money laundering ( AML ) systems play a key role in enhancing financial transparency and preventing illegal fund flows. However, during the implementation process, especially regarding data security and user privacy, there are still many challenges. For example, the large amount of sensitive information collected by platforms to meet regulatory requirements (such as identity, biometric data, etc.) may become an attack vector if not properly protected.

Therefore, we recommend introducing a dynamic risk identification system based on the traditional KYC process to reduce unnecessary information collection and lower the risk of data leakage. At the same time, the platform can connect with professional anti-money laundering and tracking platforms to assist in identifying potential suspicious transactions, thereby enhancing risk control capabilities from the source. On the other hand, the construction of data security capabilities is also indispensable. By utilizing professional red team testing services, the platform can obtain attack simulation support in a real environment, comprehensively assessing the exposure paths and risk points of sensitive data.